Religion in an Expanding Europe

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2 Faith, freedom, and federation: the role of religious ideas and institutions in European political convergence

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The dramatic inauguration of democratic regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989 and their subsequent petitions to join the European Union (EU) are usually treated as separate events. But in fact they advanced a common political result: European unity. That the European Union promotes unity is plain. But democracy is an integrating force, too. The signers of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 asserted human rights as fundamental European values: at the end of the Cold War, heads of state spoke of a "common European home" of liberal democracies extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. Together European democratization and integration have curtailed the power, autonomy, and even sovereignty of the polity that has fragmented Europe for centuries: the nation state. Transnational unity is a historically notable end, for it has long been absent from Europe, achieved first in the Roman Empire, realized last in medieval Christendom, theorized in modern times in the philosophical visions of Rousseau, Kant, and Wilson, and attempted – without ultimate success – in the imperial ambitions of Napoleon and Hitler.

Europe's increasing transnational unity in its democratic and integrative dimensions greatly interests Europe's predominant religions: Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam.[1] Given their own aspirations to transnational unity and universality, this is entirely fitting. They have a stake in this momentous trend for an additional reason: Europe's elites increasingly cast democratization and integration as secularizing projects, as José Casanova argues in this volume. Notwithstanding this fact, we emphasize in this chapter that European faiths have made important contributions to shaping and realizing the supposedly "secular" political goals of European freedom and European federation. At the same time, they differ markedly in their stances toward them. The Catholic Church actively encouraged the democratic revolutions of 1989, albeit more vigorously in some settings than others, and has strongly favored European integration since its origins after World War Two. The Orthodox

Church, by contrast, lent negligible support to the revolutions of 1989 and remains ambivalent toward European integration. Activist Islam or "Islamism" in Turkey, though not involved in the democratic revolutions of 1989, has long fought for its own democratic rights within the secularist Kemalist republic but European integration it long opposed – until recently, when Islamist party leaders came to favor it partly as a means of democratizing the Turkish state.

Why have Europe's religious communities adopted different stances toward the continent's political convergence? The most promising explanation follows the lines of the "historical institutionalist" school of political science (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002) which stresses ideas and institutions. A religious body whose (1) theology of ecclesial and political authority and (2) institutional structure and relationship to the state together favor the circumscription of the sovereign state and the creation of continent-wide political institutions tends to support European convergence. Behind these ideas and institutions lies a long history of doctrinal debate and development and changing social and political contexts that together constitute a pathway to the present.

The impact of religious ideas and institutions on European convergence is difficult to disentangle from the concurrent influences of economic forces, political trends, secular ideas, and many other factors. However, the fact that numerous analysts cite the influence of religious communities on the formation of public opinion, elite opinion, opposition activity, state policy, and international institutions in several episodes of European democratization and integration provides a warrant for further investigation.

A key to unlocking the complexity of religious communities' influence is the recognition that they are in fact complex conglomerates of agents, including upper hierarchies, lower hierarchies, a laity of official members, affiliated organizations (e.g. parties, civil society organizations, and labor unions), and the mass of people who publicly identify with a given religion. For example, building on the work of Timothy Byrnes, Bryan Hehir describes the dynamic and layered complexity of the Roman Catholic Church elsewhere in this volume. The recent controversy concerning the Catholic Church's role in the Holocaust underscores this complexity: it reflects not only a radical diversity of framing assumptions but also a smorgasbord of historical evidence created by diverse Catholic actors and even diversity within the lives of individual Catholics (for a sample of accounts, see Goldhagen, 2002; Rychlak, 2000; Cornwell, 2000). Different agents exercise different kinds of sway to achieve different sorts of ends with varying levels of vigor.

Ideas and institutions

What characterizes religious communities that promote European trans-national unity in its dual aspects of democratization and integration? What characterizes religious communities that oppose European unity? What accounts for these characteristics? Part of the answer lies in doctrines – religious conceptions of proper institutional form and views of temporal authority, especially that of the state. The differences are rich and have their roots in centuries of development. Comparatively favorable to convergence are the doctrines of the Catholic Church. We divide those most relevant to our inquiry into six propositions, which correspond to contrasting propositions and resulting stances in Orthodoxy and Islam, as Table 2.1 illustrates. Although these propositions have been subject to "internal pluralism" within religious communities (Appleby, 2000), consensus within single religious communities is wide and consistent enough to form a distinct contrast with other religious communities.

First, the Roman Catholic Church holds an ecclesiology that stresses visible unity centered upon a single hierarchy. Though the Church's structure today differs from its first-century form, its priestly hierarchy has always been capped by bishops, with the Bishop of Rome being *primus inter pares*, as Bryan Hehir and Timothy Byrnes elaborate in this volume. Second, since the Middle Ages, the Church has conceived Europe organically as a Christian civilization whose unity subsists in the Church itself (John Paul II, 2003; Southern, 1970: 15–23; Martin, 1978: 100). Third, the Church has long expressed skepticism toward what it views as the chief usurper of this unity – the sovereign state and particularly the sovereign-state system that emerged through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The contrast between this conception and the realist valorization of the state could hardly be greater, as Hehir notes in chapter 4. Catholicism is likewise reserved toward the nation or community that aspires to statehood (Weigel, 1999: 652). The Church continued to oppose the concept of sovereignty in the nineteenth century, rejecting international law as a "Protestant science" and censoring the works of Protestant international lawyer Hugo Grotius. Although in the twentieth century the Church came to allow the sovereign state as legitimate in principle, it still insisted upon its accountability to a larger moral order and promoted institutions to ensure this accountability (Philpott, 2001c: 85–88, 261–62). Fourth, the Catholic Church has long held some version of the "two swords" doctrine of Pope Gelasius: temporal and spiritual authority ought to reside in separate hands. Fifth, through a dialogue with the modern world, the Church came to graft into its doctrine of morally circumscribed state authority modern ideas of human rights

Table 2.1: *Religious communities' political ideas about the sovereign state and European unity*

Idea	Catholicism	Orthodoxy	Turkish Islam
Conception of religious unity	Visible unity, centered on hierarchy of bishops and pope	Visible unity, but decentralized, without Pope	Historically, strong conception, centered on Caliphate
Conception of Europe	United Christian civilization subsisting in Church itself	United Christian civilization, but not dominated by the West	Skeptical of Christian Europe; historically, only acceptable European unity is under Ottoman rule
View of sovereign state and nation	Skeptical, ought to be limited by universal authority	No enduring opposition; in twentieth century, autocephaly	Ottoman Empire outside of sovereign states system; opposition to Kemalism's embrace of nation-state
Relationship between temporal and spiritual authority	Ought to be separate	Close relationship, caesaro-papism	Ottoman Empire subordinated religious to political authority; Kemalists have continued tradition with hostility to Islam
View of human rights and democracy	Favorable after Vatican II in 1960s	No strong and uniform favor, only some voices	Historically, distrust of human rights and democracy, but recent embrace
View of role of Islam in Europe	After Vatican II, inclusive, stressing dialogue	Exclusion of Islam from United Europe	Historically, opposed to membership in Europe, but recent favor

and democracy. Its embrace of human rights began with Pope John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris* in 1963 and culminated in the 1965 document of the Second Vatican Council, *Dignitatis Humanae*, which endorsed religious freedom for the first time. Religious freedom, human rights, and democracy then became central themes in the teachings of John Paul II. Sixth, it was also in the Second Vatican Council that the Church adopted a more inclusive approach to Europe's Christian foundations, which called for dialogue and reconciliation with Protestants, Muslims, and Jews (Sutton, 1997: 23–25; Second Vatican Council, 1965; John Paul II, 1995).

Other major religious bodies in Europe have not necessarily espoused the mirror opposite of these six propositions but have been more ambiguous and sometimes skeptical. Eastern Orthodoxy has continued to teach an ecclesiology of visible unity since the schism of 1054 but in a more decentralized fashion than the Catholic Church. It also envisions a united Christian Europe but is wary of one dominated by the West, a concern dating back to the first millennium of Christianity (Ware, 1963: 18–72, 239–63). Never having struggled to defend its transnational unity against the Reformation or the rise of the sovereign state, Orthodoxy does not harbor Catholicism's skepticism toward the nation and the state. It has long embraced "Caesaro-Papism," the originally Byzantine "symphonic" model of church-state cooperation, involving significant integration of spiritual and temporal authority. For over a century, its ecclesiastical structure has been divided along national lines in what is known as "autocephaly." Consistent with this national structure, the Orthodox Church in a historically Orthodox country such as Serbia, Russia, or Greece usually considers itself the unique guardian of its people's national identity and cultural autonomy, as Sabrina Ramet and Vjekoslav Perica note in their contributions to this volume (see also Perica, 2001). Unlike the Catholic Church, Orthodoxy has never decisively incorporated human rights and democracy into its central teachings and in some instances, according to Ramet, directly opposes religious freedom and other liberal-democratic principles. Though today Orthodoxy contains important voices favorable to these ideas, it lacks anything like a magisterium or encyclical tradition to give them unity and overriding authority. Finally, its notion of Christian Europe is comparatively more exclusive, particularly vis-à-vis Islam in general and Turkey in particular, in part because of Orthodoxy's historic experience of subjugation by the Ottoman Empire.

Islam in the Ottoman Empire placed a strong emphasis on visible religious unity, centered on the Sultan and Caliphate. With the Kemalist revolution and the abolition of Ottoman rule in 1924, Islam became

subject to a radically secularist state. In relation to Europe, Ottoman Muslims had perceived European efforts to unify the continent as anti-Muslim and strategically threatening; the only European unity the Ottomans could accept was one wrought by Ottoman conquest. Until the eighteenth century, this remained a realistic prospect: the Ottoman Empire captured portions of Eastern, Central, and Southwestern Europe and was poised to expand further. Because the Kemalist revolution implied a radically more positive attitude to Christian Europe as a model of modernity and progress, traditionalist Muslims in Turkey came to distrust Europe even more profoundly (Yavuz, 2003: 249). In addition, Ottoman Islam was never part of the Westphalian state system: the polities negotiating the Peace of Westphalia, for example, conceived of themselves as the "Senate of Christian Europe" and did not consider Islam a member of "international society" (Naff, 1984). When European powers defeated the Ottoman Empire after World War One, they in effect imposed the Westphalian system on it and forcibly turned it into a collection of ethnically defined nation-states. Atatürk made a virtue of necessity and embraced the Western nation-state and Europeanization as essential to Turkey's progress (Yavuz, this volume). Traditional Islam was compelled to defer to and operate within Atatürk's authoritarian republicanism (Yavuz, 2000, 2003). Such deference actually continued – albeit in a radicalized way – the traditional Ottoman practice of subordinating religious to political authority, which the Ottomans arguably inherited from the Byzantine Empire (Quataert, 2000: 4). Recently, however, devout Muslims have struggled to secure greater freedom for themselves in Turkish civil society and politics. Both the Kemalist nationalists and Islamists have distrusted the Western tradition of human rights and democracy, though both have recently changed their attitudes. The groups continue to disagree, however, over how much public influence Islam should exert on Turkish politics and civil society (Yavuz, 2003: 249).

Besides ideas, the institutional structure of religious communities and their institutional relationship to the state also influence their stance toward European unity. This is best described through a concept from the sociology of religion: differentiation (Martin, 1978: 69; Casanova, 1994: 11–66). Religious communities are differentiated when they are separated in their roles and jurisdictions from the state: one does not participate in the other's governance or perform the other's activities (Stepan, 2000, 2001). Most essential is independence from the state in governance. Does the state exercise influence over its selection of leadership? Its finances? Its doctrines? Its practice? Do religious leaders themselves perform temporal functions or hold state offices? Differentiation in governance often has important historical roots, arising from the

religion's historical relationship to the state, its recent history of persecution or freedom, and its own response of resistance or accommodation. Another measure of differentiation is the strength of a religious body's transnational ties to co-religionists and external supporters, which can strengthen it with respect to the state. A differentiated religious body might also benefit from ties with civil society. Finally, a religious body might also differentiate itself from the state through identifying with the nation and throws its allegiance behind a state as an expression of a shared religious nationalism, then it will be weakly differentiated (Perica, 2002, 2004). But a religious group sometimes identifies strongly and simultaneously with a particular nation *and* with a transnational religious community and, based on this dual affinity, sharply differentiates itself from the state – especially when the state is deemed hostile to both God and country (Martin, 1978: 100–08).

The more a religious body is differentiated from the state along these dimensions, the more likely it is to support European convergence. It can adopt such a commitment insofar as freedom from the state allows it to do so. Having identified its interests independently of the state, it is better able to articulate a vision of transnational unity. Ideas and institutions are related. A religious body's own ecclesiology determines its institutional structure, which in turn determines the prerogatives and distance it demands from the state. A religious body differentiated from the state is in turn more likely to espouse European unity in its democratic and integrative dimensions.

Together, ideas and the differentiation of institutions offer a powerful explanation of religious communities' divergent stances toward European unity. In the Catholic case, transnational unity, skepticism toward the sovereign state, and an embrace of human rights and democracy, combined with strong ecclesial resistance to state encroachment, generated a powerful opposition to communist regimes – especially in Poland and Lithuania – as well as strong support for European integration from its inception in 1950. The Orthodox Church, weaker in its institutional unity, less friendly to European unity, and less hostile to the nation and the state, possessed weak conceptual and institutional equipment with which to favor the revolutions of 1989 and was far more disposed to ally with the communist state. In addition, as the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church illustrates, it has offered a mixed message toward European integration. Devout and politically assertive forms of Turkish Islam, also known as "Islamist," have opposed the Kemalist nation-state but remained weakly differentiated in their relationship to it, resulting in an ongoing and only partially successful struggle for a more autonomous

space for Islam and hence for a more democratic politics. At the same time, Islamists traditionally opposed Turkish involvement in the "Christian club" of the European Union. Hakan Yavuz notes in this volume that, in pursuit of a "democratic Islamic identity," Islamists reversed this long-standing hostility in the late 1990s and now support Turkey's accession to the European Union precisely as a means of expanding an open democratic politics and hence the freedom of Muslims to shape public life. Islam in Turkey is thus a fascinating mixed case: in its basic ideas, it resists both the comprehensive claims of the secular state as well as either Christian- or secular-dominated European integration, but in its weak institutional differentiation as a historical legacy and contemporary fact, it embraces the EU in order to win by international means the political autonomy it cannot win by domestic means alone.

Religion and the democratic revolutions of 1989

Whatever differences in political form divided European states prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall – democratic socialism vs. free-market liberalism, firm alignment with the Western alliance vs. "third way" neutrality – no difference was sharper than the one created by what Winston Churchill termed the Iron Curtain. In the 1970s and 1980s, Spain, Portugal, and Greece had come to join and nearly complete the European community of liberal democracies outside the communist bloc. So when the revolutions of 1989 rocketed through Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union suddenly collapsed in 1991, leaving the Baltic states and the Ukraine to emerge as democracies and Russia to begin its own troubled democratic development, Europe was more united in its basic political commitments than at any time since the Middle Ages (Nexon, this volume, chapter 10).

Among religious communities, the Catholic Church most vigorously promoted democracy in the revolutions of 1989. The Church in Poland, for example, advanced democracy in several ways. One was the direct protest of diverse voices in the Church – dissident statements, writings, and marches. During the early 1950s, as the communist regime was attempting to control the Church, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, who enjoyed enormous prestige and popularity, began to utter statements of defiance, a practice he would continue for several decades. Catholics at the grassroots also protested, supported by the Church's underground catechetical centers, summer camps, and educational programs (Rydel, 2001: 46–47; Broun, 1988: 333–34; Weigel, 1992: 111).

During the 1970s, Polish prelates adopted the language of human rights, following the lead of Vatican II. Then, too, a Catholic newspaper, *Tygodnik Powszechny* ("Universal Weekly") began to declaim against the regime. These and other instances led to a crescendo of dissent in the 1980s, when the Church cooperated with Solidarity in mounting mass demonstrations, speaking out against the martial law the regime imposed in 1981, and offering a place of sanctuary and organization for underground groups (Mojzes, 1992: 294–98; Jerschina, 1990: 94–95).

One of the most important modes of resistance was the Church's use of religious rituals and forms of piety through which it sustained its morale, guarded its independence, and defied the regime. As early as the 1950s, clergy spoke out against the regime through the mass and other religious meetings as well as summer camps, programs of religious instruction, and cultural activities, as Ramet details in chapter 5 of this volume (see also Rydel, 2001: 45–46). From 1957 to 1966, Cardinal Wyszynski led the Polish Church in a Great Novena campaign of prayer, pilgrimages, catechesis, and teaching deliberately designed to defy the regime. During the 1980s, open-air Catholic masses took on the flavor of public demonstrations. Particularly defiant were those celebrated by Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, a Solidarity priest who preached non-violent resistance. After the regime's security officers murdered him on October 19, 1984, hundreds of thousands attended his funeral, honoring him as a martyr priest (Weigel, 1992: 115–17, 149–50).

The Polish Church's most important asset of all was a richly transnational one: Karol Wojtyla, elevated from Archbishop of Krakow to become Pope John Paul II in October 1978, was the native son whom Poles would widely regard as "the fulcrum of the Revolution of 1989." In a decisive shift which Hehir analyzes in this volume, John Paul II departed from the earlier *Ostpolitik* of Pope Paul VI by refusing to engage with communism as a permanent political reality. Instead, he challenged it head-on by underscoring the inviolability of human rights, especially religious freedom, and emphasizing their transcendent foundation. Armed with these themes, he exercised skillful symbolic leadership. On his first papal visit to Poland in 1979, he drew hundreds of thousands, whom he galvanized through appeals to human rights – religious freedom above all – and his summons to the Polish Catholic Church to liberate Churches throughout the communist bloc. Later visits in 1983 and 1987 attracted similar crowds (Weigel, 1992: 129–37).

One of the greatest fruits of John Paul II's visits was the strengthening of the Solidarity trade union – the most important example of the Church's active cooperation with other civil society organizations against the regime. An organization of 10–12 million, Solidarity was the largest

civil society organization in Polish history. It used religious symbols, was highly committed to religious freedom, turned to the Church for spiritual support – priests said mass for workers, for instance – and cooperated closely with the Church in leading resistance (though see Ramet, this volume, ch. 5). Though formally economic, it was importantly spiritual (Mojzes, 1992: 297–99).

Among religious communities in the 1989 revolutions, the Polish Church's democratizing activity was uniquely robust. The Church played a comparably significant political role in Lithuania. Here, too, protest enjoyed a mass base, involving rural and urban, rich and poor, educated and uneducated. It took the form of a series of popular petitions from 1968 to 1974, and, beginning in 1972, an underground newspaper, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, inspired by Vatican II to promote the idea of human rights. A national opposition movement, Sajudis, used churches for political rallies. Ceremony was also a strong form of defiance in Lithuania, although less in the form of masses and more through national and religious songs (Vardys, 1978: 132–35, 144–45, 1981: 1).

In Czechoslovakia, the Church never galvanized a unified opposition movement of the sort that emerged in Poland or Lithuania, though in the early 1980s its opposition grew from sparse to palpable. The leading prelate, František Cardinal Tomášek, refrained from speaking out strongly against the regime through the late 1970s, adopting instead a strategy of accommodation to protect the Church. In the 1980s, a Catholic peasant, Augustin Navrátil, garnered 500,000 signatures on a petition demanding religious freedom, non-interference by the state in internal Church matters, and wider distribution of religious texts. During the 1980s Cardinal Tomášek then began to speak against the regime, emboldened by Navrátil and by the example and support of John Paul II. In a growing opposition movement, Catholics began to cooperate with non-Catholics, and Czechs with Slovaks, culminating in mass protests in 1988 and in 1989.

The Church in Hungary, save the steady but lonely voice of József Cardinal Mindszenty, opposed its communist rulers very little, at least until the 1989 revolutions. For decades an important symbol of opposition, Mindszenty was arrested and imprisoned in the earliest years of communism and then helped to bring about the short-lived revolution of 1956. He spent the next fifteen years protected within the walls of the US Embassy, where he remained a fairly isolated voice of opposition, hardly supported even by the Vatican. The period 1963 through 1989 was then a period of thaw, during which the regime allowed the Church to practice worship, education, and other activities and to exercise a joint role in the

appointment of its own bishops, while the Church agreed not to oppose the state (Brown, 1988: 129–47; Ramet, 1998: 112–19).

The story of the Orthodox Church's stance toward communism was similar in both Bulgaria and Romania – by and large, one of subservience to the regime. Both churches, which had achieved autocephaly prior to the onset of the communist regime, suffered severe Stalinist purges during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Dissident priests, bishops, and nuns were killed; those who remained either supported the state or refrained from opposing it. In both countries, the Orthodox Church supported the regime by espousing propaganda on its behalf (Hale, 1971: 45, quoted in Ramet, 1998: 193). Once the Church's loyalty was established, the regime returned the favor. In Romania, for instance, the state celebrated the seventy-fifth anniversary of autocephaly, and after 1962, promoted the Church as representative of the Romanian nation. Only in the revolutions of 1989 did small dissident movements appear within Orthodoxy (Ramet, 1989: 20; Ramet, 1998: 191).

Due to a similar history of weak differentiation, Turkey also succeeded in subordinating religion to state – though in this case religion has increasingly sought to break out of its subordinate role. From the founding of the Turkish Republic under Kemal Atatürk, secular republicanism has come at the expense of robust democracy and autonomous civil society. Hakan Yavuz observes in this volume that for Atatürk, inspired by a positivist and Jacobin version of secularism, there could be no successful Westernization without state "reform" and repression of religion (see also Yavuz, 1999: 116–17). The tensions between Kemalist secularism and democracy became particularly acute after a military coup on September 12, 1980, which led to a revised constitution making the military the permanent guardian of the country's secular and republican values. Turkish politics has since been a story of unresolved struggle between the military guardians of Kemalist republicanism, who wish to preserve the secular republic against anti-modern religion, and Islamists, who wish to secure the freedom of religion to influence state and society (Insel, 2003).

However, a combination of weak differentiation and the persistence of secularist ideas and institutions has wrought important changes in Turkish Islam. In particular, the limited room for maneuver permitted by secularism has forced devout and traditionalist Muslims either to adapt to it or to accept having no public influence. Those who adapt *ipso facto* accept certain ideas: the state sets the parameters of religion's public existence; the only way to change the state is from the inside. So-called "Islamists" have adopted these ideas and organized a succession of political parties – the Welfare Party (RP), Virtue Party (FP), and today's

governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) – reflecting them. Self-consciously inspired by European Christian Democracy, these parties adapt the Islamic faith to Turkish secular politics by emphasizing its ethical implications.

The gradualist "insider strategy" of the Islamists scored important successes in the early 1990s. In June 1996, the Islamist Welfare Party won enough votes to be the dominant partner in a coalition government, meaning that "for the first time since the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey's prime minister was a leader whose avowed political philosophy and personal identity was based on Islam" (Yavuz, 2003: 3). The generals struck back: unwilling to countenance a politically assertive Islamism, the military-bureaucratic establishment of the September 12 regime brought the government down in a "soft coup" in February 1997 and pressured the Constitutional Court to dissolve the Welfare Party in January 1998. The message to Islamists was clear: generals, not elections, would decide the appropriate parameters of secularist republicanism.

In November 2002, the latest Islamist political party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), won an even larger share of the vote than the WP in 1996. The party leader, Tayyip Erdogan, became prime minister. The party's rhetoric was striking for its incessant emphasis on democracy (Önis and Keyman, 2003: 99). But the question is whether the military remains the effective guardian of secularist republicanism, ready and able to intervene when it deems necessary. Until its role is officially and permanently transformed through constitutional change, democratic consolidation remains incomplete and precarious.

Explaining the democratic activity of religions

Behind the stark differences in these religious communities' democratic activity in the revolutions of 1989 was largely their respective political theologies. In the Catholic Church, long-standing themes of European unity, skepticism toward the secularizing tendencies of the sovereign state, and concern for the integrity of its visible unity evolved into support for liberal democracy in the context of the late twentieth century. Earlier in the century, these same themes had motivated the Vatican's censure of communism, which it spoke against repeatedly, as well as fascism, which Pope Pius XI condemned in several of its settings, including Nazi Germany in his encyclical of 1937, *Mit Brennender Sorge*. After World War Two, fascism was defeated, but communism spread into Eastern Europe, where it brutally suppressed the Church. Accordingly, Pope

Pius XII was uncompromising in his opposition, as Hehir describes in this volume. His 1949 address in St. Peter's Square was typical:

> It is only too well known what the totalitarian, anti-religious state . . . demands of the church as the vice of its tolerance, a church that is silent when it should preach, a church that does not oppose the violation of conscience and does not protect the true freedom of the people and its well founded rights; a church that, with a dishonorable, slavish mentality, closes itself within the four walls of its temples. (Hehir, 1990)

By contrast, Western democracies had emerged as states in which the Church was protected through constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and where Catholic ideas could be expressed in politics through Christian Democratic parties. Such a rapprochement helped to set the stage for the Church's embrace of human rights in Vatican II.

In his teachings on the political order, John Paul II has interwoven these themes. Having participated influentially in Vatican II, he promoted its teachings on human rights throughout his pontificate and also commended democracy, most forcefully in his 1991 encyclical, *Centesimus Annus*. He supported European unity consistently and strongly, opposing the "logic of the blocs" before 1989 (Hehir, ch. 4), and all along viewing Europe as a common Christian civilization – even calling for an enlargement of the European Community to its eastern neighbors as early as 1988. Poland, he believed, plays a particularly important role in these developments. In 1980, he proclaimed Saints Cyril and Methodius, who brought Christianity to the Slavic people from the Byzantine Empire to the East during the tenth century, as co-patrons of Europe. Likewise, a Slavic and Christian Poland would strive to bring unity to Eastern and Western Europe through its struggle against communism. Such teachings could effect social change. It was a post-Vatican II Church that made possible the "Third Wave" of democratization from 1974 to 1990, roughly three-quarters of whose thirty states were Catholic. It was Pope John Paul II that made possible the Church's role in the 1989 episodes of the Third Wave (Sutton, 1997: 17, 22; Philpott, 2004).

The strength and breadth of these ideas in Catholic countries correspond to the varying degrees of Catholic democratic opposition found there. In Poland, these ideas were most empowered. In the 1970s, following Vatican II, the Polish hierarchy incorporated human rights, including religious freedom, into its statements against the regime. Pope John Paul then inspired Poles of all ranks with his call for the nation, through its very history of suffering, to be a carrier of freedoms to parts of Europe that did

not yet enjoy them, thus uniting the continent. Catholic oppositional voices in Lithuania also embraced the Church's teachings on human rights vigorously and early after their proclamation. Czechoslovakia's embrace of human rights and democracy was weaker, as was its democratic activity. It wasn't until the 1980s that Catholic voices began to speak for human rights – Cardinal Tomášek, through his statements, Augustin Navratil, through his petitions – though never with the numbers or the force of the Polish Church. In Hungary, Catholics who embraced the Church's teachings on human rights and European unity were fewer still (Mojzes, 1992: 294–95; Vardys, 1981: 1).

The Orthodox Church's heritage of ideas did not suit it well to oppose communism in Bulgaria and Romania. An ecclesiology that allowed far more division of its authority along national lines than that of the Catholic Church, a weaker stress on separation of authority and a relative openness to Caesaro-papism, and a lack of strong embrace of human rights and democracy all characterized the Church in Romania and Bulgaria, as it did elsewhere. Opposition to communism was feeble.

Again, ideas alone do not explain democratic activity. What gives ideas comparative efficacy across undemocratic regimes is the relative power that religious communities derive from their institutional relationship to the state – that is, the level of differentiation that they practice. In their relationship to religion, the most robust liberal democracies are characterized by what Alfred Stepan has called the "twin tolerations," by which the state respects the prerogatives of all religious bodies to practice and express their faith and to participate in democratic politics, while religious bodies consent to a thoroughgoing religious freedom and forgo legal or constitutional prerogatives that grant religious officials standing authority to formulate or approve public policy (Stepan, 2000, 2001: 213–53). Democratic differentiation is precisely what churches struggled for under the rule of communist regimes and precisely what these regimes sought to deny them – ruthlessly during their early years, steadily throughout their reign. Yet even under regimes determined to suppress religion thoroughly, more and less differentiation existed.

Where religious communities were more differentiated, they were more likely to challenge their regimes actively and effectively. What differentiation rendered for them is a sphere of autonomy – "moral extraterritoriality," as George Weigel has aptly called it – in which they could maintain an alternative discourse and wage oppositional activity (Weigel, 1992: 151). From their island of differentiation, religious bodies waged proto-democratic politics that ultimately resulted in the onset of democratic regimes (Stepan, 2001: 159–80).

In Poland, though the communist regime sought to denude the Church of its prerogatives over worship, expression, internal organization, education, and the running of hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages, though it sought to delink the Church from the Polish nation, history, and culture, the Church here fought back with more success than churches elsewhere. Its leaders preserved a significant role in appointing their own bishops and church officials, and exercised autonomy in creating and running religious education programs and camps for children, publishing religious texts and periodicals, leading their people in national programs to instill piety, and traveling abroad and serving as chaplains in the armed forces. "The church – strong and independent – has far greater authority than the government with the population. To survive politically, the Polish Communist regime needs the support of the church," writes Janice Broun (1988: 168). Although Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski prided himself on not being subservient to Rome, especially during the Vatican's *Ospolitik* of the 1960s and 1970s, the Polish Church's communication with Rome and its allegiance to its doctrinal authority remained strong. The strength and richness of this transnational tie only increased once John Paul II assumed the papacy. The Church was also strengthened in its independence from the state through its collaboration with Solidarity during the 1980s, and through its civic activity – for example, its priests ministering to prisoners and hospital patients, though they were housed in state institutions.

A particularly powerful source of differentiation was the Church's role as a symbol of Polish national identity. Against the efforts of the communist state to suppress this identity, the Church was viewed popularly as a carrier, a protector, and a standard bearer of the nation. All of this was the legacy of the Church's own long history of fighting to preserve its – and Poland's – autonomy against the harsh rule of both Russia and Prussia during its period of partition from 1795 to 1918. During the interwar period, it experienced a brief spell of favor from the Polish government, only to revert to a position of determined opposition during World War Two, when Poles mounted resistance to both Nazi and communist Russian invaders. A history of defiance bequeathed relatively strong institutional differentiation, which in turn enabled and permitted the Church to carry out strong democratic activity compared to religious communities elsewhere.

The Catholic Church in other states followed suit, the level of their democratic activity corresponding to their differentiation from the state. In Lithuania, strong democratic activity was the work of a Church that the Lithuanian people had viewed as a symbol of its nationhood since the nineteenth century. During communism, it became the "guardian of the nation's cultural heritage" (Girnius, 1989: 109). It was also a Church that

managed to publish an underground newspaper and maintain an active organization despite harsh reprisals.

The Czechoslovakian Church, whose democratic activity was consistently weaker, had lost the support of the nation, especially in Bohemia, when the Catholic Habsburg Counter-Reformation state defeated and persecuted indigenous Protestantism in the seventeenth century. Subsequently the Habsburgs favored the Catholic Church, but exercised strong control over its internal leadership. Under communism, then, the Church retained few prerogatives in the face of persecution. It sought instead to negotiate agreements with the regime, but often to little avail: between 1973 and 1989, ten of thirteen dioceses remained without a residential bishop (Weigel, 1992: 173; Ramet, 1998: 112–19).

The Hungarian Church's affiliation with its national identity was stronger than the Czech Church's, but weaker than the Polish Church's. It had never dealt a major defeat to Protestant and nationalist aspirations, but it, too, had come under the strong control of the Habsburg state, even during the period of its disestablishment between 1867 and 1948. During World War Two, it did little to oppose its government's alliance with Nazi Germany. During communism, the Church practiced meaningful prerogatives in education, printing, and other areas, but only after making a deal with the communist government that it would mutually agree upon episcopal appointments and that its clergy would sign an oath of allegiance to the Hungarian constitution. It exercised very little true independence from the state, then, and undertook little democratic activity (Ramet, 1998: 104–12).

In the Orthodox countries of Bulgaria and Romania, the Church enjoyed little differentiation at all due to a history of division along national lines, a much less centralized and unified transnational ecclesiastical structure, and a history of close cooperation with, and often subsumption under, state authority. The Bulgarian Church gained autocephaly from the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1870, shortly before the Bulgarian state gained independence from the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Under King Boris III, who reigned from 1918 to 1943, the state established firm control over the Church, exercising strong governance, providing the Church with its finances, and taking over independent roles of the Orthodox Church in civil society. In the Romanian state, the government came to dominate the Orthodox Church soon after independence in 1878. Both states, then, were ripe for purge and takeover, when communist regimes came into power in the late 1940s. Both communist states exercised thorough control over their Orthodox Churches. Whatever prerogatives each Church practiced in education or publishing, they did so at the strict sufferance of the regime. Neither

Church exercised contact or communication with outside Orthodox Churches, except with Moscow, whose government controlled the governments of Bulgaria and Romania (Ramet, 1998; 181–201, 275–307).

Islam in Turkey illustrates the close interrelationship of ideas and institutions in explaining the democratizing impact of religion. Institutionally, of course, Islam has been intensively scrutinized and tightly controlled by the secularist Kemalist state, particularly since 1980. Islam in Turkey has enjoyed limited room for maneuver not only because of the radical secularism of the Kemalist revolution but also because of a long historical legacy of state-controlled religion going back to the Ottomans and even the Byzantines. "Like the Byzantines, the Ottomans practiced a kind of caesaro-papism, the system in which the state controlled the clergy" (Quataert, 2000: 4). This long-standing practice provides the Kemalist state with a certain legitimacy in keeping "religion within the limits of republicanism alone," to paraphrase Kant. Religions that oppose secularism and religious subordination, therefore, run the risk of being branded anti-national and unpatriotic. Consequently, Muslims who wish to exercise public influence and make state and society more open to religion must adopt certain ideas: above all, an Islamist ideology that emphasizes religious ethics and values over doctrines, and a political strategy that emphasizes gradual change from within the system. According to Yavuz's analysis in this volume, Kemalist "statism" fosters a weak, undifferentiated, and non-autonomous religious sphere cut off from transnational institutions and networks — one poorly equipped, in other words, to effect the dramatic political changes characteristic of the East and Central European revolutions of 1989.

Therefore, a religious body's level of differentiation from the state, together with its political theology, correlates closely with the vigor of its opposition to communist regimes in the revolutions of 1989 as well as to authoritarianism in Turkey after 1980 and thereby its contribution to the unity of Europe. But if religion matters, shouldn't more intensely religious countries be more effective opponents of anti-religious regimes? Shouldn't religious intensity matter at least as much as religious differentiation or religious ideas? As measured by belief and practice, religiosity would seem a powerful variable. Poland is by far the most religious of the countries that lived under communism; the Catholic Church there actually grew under communist rule. By contrast, the Czech Republic ranked as the least religious country in the world, and was indeed a weak democratizer. But the conclusion must be qualified. The Church in Czechoslovakia increased its democratizing activity even though popular levels of attendance and belief remained low. And to draw from a

pre-1989 example, the case of Greece, a highly religious country, democratized with little participation by churches or religious believers. Democratic activity, then, depends far more on the ideas and autonomy of organized believers than on the level of religiosity in a country at large.

Religion and European integration

In contributing, more or less, to the democratic revolutions of 1989, religious communities thereby contributed, more or less, to a second major stage of European unity: the enlargement of the European Union. Only once they became democratic could formerly communist regimes accede to the EU. In 2004, many of them did.

Religious communities also contributed to European integration more directly, however. Again, more or less; the pattern here is similar to that of democratization. Due largely to Catholicism's historic theological and social ideas and legacy of institutional differentiation, the Catholic Church actively inspired, promoted, and shaped European integration in order to secure durable transnational ideals and interests. Other religious actors — particularly Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, but also Protestant churches — favor religion–state differentiation more weakly in their theology, and, both historically and recently, have enjoyed less political independence and institutional capacity to transcend national contexts. They have consequently played a relatively weak and sporadic role in promoting and shaping European integration. Where they have publicly sought to do so, their support has been more ambiguous and less consistent over time and has had the aim of securing relatively shifting national religious and political goals.

Catholicism and European integration

Consider two recent statements. On March 3, 2004, the Vatican announced the final stage of the beatification of Robert Schuman, the French politician, devout Catholic, first president of the European Parliament, and founding father of European political unity (Zenit News Agency, 2004a). Less than three weeks later, on March 23, 2004, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder praised Pope John Paul II for consolidating and extending the process of European integration, bridging Europe's East and West, and contributing decisively to the peaceful unification of the continent (Zenit News Agency, 2004b).

Catholic popes and Catholic politicians have indeed contributed decisively to European integration, from its postwar beginnings through its subsequent dramatic successes. Even before World War Two had

ended. Pope Pius XII publicly advocated "a federated international system" as a check on future military aggression and insisted that "there is no time to lose" in establishing a "European union" to safeguard freedom and peace on the continent. He called all Catholics to support this effort. In 1953, clearly referring to the communist threat, Pius XII called on a "united Europe" to affirm its Christian foundations without which it would lack the "inner strength" to preserve its independence "in the face of more powerful adversaries" (Nelsen and Guth, 2003b: 18). Later popes continued to support European integration strongly. John Paul II has endorsed it in many statements, perhaps most strongly in his 1988 address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where, even before the Iron Curtain fell, he called for Eastern enlargement so that the whole continent might again "breathe with both lungs" (Sutton, 1997: 17).

Catholic politicians have supported European political integration at every crucial stage. Adrian Hastings observed that "almost everyone who has been really influential in the creating of the EU has been a socially minded Catholic from Schuman and Adenauer to [Jacques] Delors and [Jacques] Santer" (Hastings, 1997: 122). Hastings might have included in his list Jean Monnet (who was a nominal Catholic, though his sister was a prominent lay leader) and Catholic Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi among the founders, and Romano Prodi, the devoutly Catholic former Italian prime minister and current president of the European Commission, among the contemporaries (Gillingham, 2003: 16–33). The faith of these politicians was no mere window dressing on their integrationist efforts: most of them were steeped in Christian Democracy, a largely Catholic political movement. Christian Democracy stressed fidelity to Catholic social teaching, though it remained led by laity and independent of ecclesiastical control in the political sphere. Consequently, Christian Democrats could enthusiastically pursue European integration knowing that it enjoyed papal blessing, yet at the same time devise their own political strategy and institutions for realizing the general goal. In gradually constructing the edifice of European integration, beginning with the Hague conference in 1948, Christian Democratic politicians relied not on papal direction but rather on their own party institutions and pan-European networks and publications. They formed the most important nucleus of Europhiles since the postwar left was deeply divided over integration, while "the Protestants of Britain and the Nordic region were not interested in the supranational character of Continental proposals" (Nelsen and Guth, 2003b: 19). The Christian Democratic network was involved at later strategic points. Through the European People's Party (EPP), the pan-European network of like-minded and mostly Christian Democratic political parties,

it encouraged the formulation and passage of the Single European Act in the mid-1980s – over the initial opposition of Protestant Britain and Denmark as well as Orthodox Greece (Johansson, 2002; see also Kalyvas, 1996).

All along, this pro-integrationist nexus of the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic politicians generally supported an approach to the continent's political integration that was faster, deeper, and broader than that supported by any other distinct grouping. Those countries temporarily delaying, selectively opting out of, or permanently holding out from such rapid and robust integration were and are almost always majority-Protestant countries, with much weaker or entirely non-existent traditions of Christian Democracy – Iceland and Norway, which remain steadfastly outside the EU, as well as Denmark, Sweden, and Britain, which have repeatedly sought to slow, limit, or opt out of various aspects of integration, most notably the single European currency.

The kind of European integration Catholic actors favor is one in which Christianity plays a vigorous public role, yet respects the legitimate autonomy of the civil order – i.e. differentiation. To be sure, as Timothy Byrnes points out in this volume, John Paul II hoped to re-evangelize Europe, envisioning his native Poland as the leader of this effort, and to shape the European Union's public policy, as evidenced by the Church's creation of a Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community. The Vatican itself, though, is interested less in imparting a religious tincture to an otherwise secular institution than in ensuring that this institution does not trespass on the legitimate autonomy and distinctive "juridical personality" of the Church and other religious communities. It envisions the EU embodying a pluralistic respect for Europe's religious diversity, rather than imposing either a common secular ideology or a confessionally derived church–state model. The Vatican therefore argued (up until the issue was settled in June 2004, contrary to its position) that the EU draft constitution ought to include a reference to Europe's "religious heritage" and to the "particular" Christian contribution to that heritage in much the same spirit that José Casanova conceives such a reference in this volume: as an encouragement of the healthy public participation of religion, as a recognition of the historic role of Christianity in helping to develop secular values like equality, freedom, and solidarity, and even as a balm that might soften historical divides between religion and secularism.

Relevant to the Vatican's vision of legitimate religious and cultural diversity is the controversial question of Turkish accession to the EU. While Vatican officials, including former Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, have expressed hesitations about this possibility; more recently the Holy See seems to have clarified its position: it does not oppose Turkish accession

in principle but only an excessively hasty accession process that might cause unnecessary conflict. Pope John Paul II himself in effect held that religious adherence alone is irrelevant to EU membership insofar as he unequivocally endorsed the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose population has a Muslim plurality of about 40 percent. Whether Ratzinger, now that he has become Pope Benedict XVI, will shift the position of the Holy See remains to be determined.

From popes to politicians, a wide array of Catholics have actively promoted European integration. They have promoted it, too, according to distinctive Catholic ends and emphases: the defense of Christian civilization against totalitarianism (during the Cold War); the restoration of Europe's original Christian unity; the recognition of Europe's Christian roots in the context of a respect for all of the continent's rich religious and cultural streams; the dependence of Europe's peace and security on authoritative supranational political structures; the recognition of the independence and distinct "juridical personality" of the Church and other religious communities; and a wide and religiously inclusive view of the limits of European Union expansion. The Catholicism of these actors was a crucial element in their support for European integration and in their conception of its depth, breadth, and form.

Orthodoxy and European integration

The Orthodox Church's relatively weaker compatibility with European integration is revealed by the contours of the 2004 enlargement of the European Union. Of the ten new entrants of that year, only Cyprus is at all (and only partially) Orthodox, while predominantly Orthodox Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia were not admitted. All of the other new members are Catholic and Protestant, making the enlargement in effect a consolidation of Latin Christendom. The conclusion must surely be qualified: Bulgaria, Romania, and perhaps Serbia may well become members in the near future, while Orthodox Greece has been a member since 1981. Whatever these national governments eventually negotiate, though, the map of enlargement illustrates the comparative lack of support for integration among the several national Orthodox churches. Indeed, they range in their stances from qualified support to outright hostility, often expressed in distinctly civilizational terms, as illustrated by the case of Greece, by Vjekoslav Perica's treatment of Serbia (this volume, chapter 7), and by Sabrina Ramet's examination of a broader array of Orthodox churches (this volume, chapter 6).

No Orthodox country was part of the European Union until Greece joined in 1981, which means that the Orthodox Church became a

relevant actor in the European integration process only at a relatively late stage. Of course, the main factor limiting the opportunity of Orthodox countries to join the European Union has been communism: with the exceptions of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, all of Europe's Orthodox countries were under communist rule and inadmissible to the European Union until the early 1990s. Orthodoxy's relatively short period of engagement with European integration compels us to be wary of simplistic comparisons with other religious communities. Yet when the case of Greece is combined with the other locales where Orthodox churches have spoken out on integration since 1989, several themes emerge. Some Orthodox churches have come to support European integration, in part to support their governments' foreign policies, which seek to make their countries full members of a democratic and prosperous Europe, but also to prevent the EU from becoming a vehicle of Western secularism and a (second) Western betrayal of Christian Europe to the Islamic east. Many Orthodox Church leaders now guardedly support the European Union, but their support is predicated on the preservation of it as a Christian European project. Since the end of the Cold War, some Orthodox Church leaders have also voiced a far sharper hostility to the European Union, viewing it as an instrument of a rival Western civilization. Such was the perspective of Serbia during the 1990s and is now the perspective of leading clerics elsewhere in the Orthodox Church.

In the case of Greece, the public engagement of the Greek Orthodox Church and its leader, the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, in European integration issues has been episodic, becoming significant only since 1998. Greece's original application for membership in 1975 under Prime Minister and later President Constantine Karamanlis and its early years of involvement in the EU following its entry in 1981 proceeded without significant Orthodox interventions. And pro-EU Greek politicians de-emphasized the cultural and religious particularities of Greece in making the case for accession. This was particularly true of the most fervent EU supporter, Karamanlis, who fought against both domestic and foreign opposition to Greek accession with the slogan, "We belong to the West" (Karamanlis, 1981; Pagoulatos, 2002: 3–4). Particularly because the European Community at the time of Greek accession was primarily a common economic market (though its states were also required to conform to common political standards), the dominant issue in the accession debate was not whether the EU would threaten Greece's sovereignty and Orthodox identity but whether its economy would benefit from market opening. On the latter grounds, there was "fervent domestic opposition" to the EU, but its main vehicles were

the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), with Orthodoxy playing no prominent part (Pagoulatos, 2002: 3).

Largely because the anti-integrationist socialists dominated Greek politics for much of the 1980s and early 1990s, Greek–EU relations became highly contentious and Greece came to be regarded as a notoriously "reluctant" and difficult member, the "black sheep" of the EU, comparable to Thatcherite Britain. Again, however, this had more to do with the country's entrenched clientelistic socialism and criticism of Northern European dominance in foreign policy and security matters than with any specifically Orthodox element, though it is probable that Orthodoxy played a secondary role in fueling the nationalistic spirit of PASOK's long-running confrontation with the EU.

A dramatic change began to occur, however, in the mid-1990s: Greeks as a whole began to move from skepticism to enthusiasm concerning the EU, while the Greek Orthodox Church, on the other hand, moved from indifference and silence to an unstable combination of guarded support and defensive hostility. A solid ideological consensus concerning the EU's essential contributions to Greece's political and economic stabilization and development had formed in the 1990s – a consensus that both reflected and fostered dramatically increased public support for the EU. This combination of elite and public support enabled Greece to join the EU's Economic and Monetary Union in January 2001 (Pagoulatos, 2002: 7–10).

At about the same time, the Orthodox Church became more publicly engaged on the subject of European integration spurred by at least four factors: the increasingly important question of the EU's religious and cultural identity, prompted by the draft Charter on Fundamental Rights as well as the later draft EU constitution; the related and increasingly discussed and controversial question of Turkey's accession to the EU; EU pressure on Greece to reform its church–state relations as a condition of deeper integration; and finally the activism of a highly articulate and outspoken churchman, Christodoulos Paraskevaides, in 1998.

As soon as he became Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, Christodoulos became a popular figure and soon used his political capital and impressive talents (including excellent English) to mount a sophisticated Orthodox campaign concerning the EU (Fokas, 2000: 12). Broadly, Christodoulos and other Orthodox Church leaders express support for European integration in general and the accession of Orthodox countries in particular, but their enthusiasm is conditioned on the preservation of the European Union as a Christian European project. If a single issue dominates the innumerable speeches Archbishop Christodoulos and

other prominent Orthodox leaders have made concerning the EU, it is the EU's Christian identity, which encompasses both the recognition of Christianity in the EU constitution and the question of Turkish accession. In contrast to the Vatican, which has signaled that its most "weighty" concerns lie elsewhere, the Archbishop has vehemently insisted that the EU officially recognize Europe's Christian identity. In an address in 2003, appropriately entitled "Nostra Europa," he unmistakably referred to the question of Turkish accession to the EU. If "countries totally irrelevant to [Europe's] culture should also be included in the Union," then "Europe will have been murdered, and we shall have nothing else to do but to entomb its unburied body" (Christodoulos, 2003).

Finally, the Archbishop as well as Orthodox leaders from Russia sharply criticize EU pressure to institute greater church–state separation in member countries (Fokas, 2000; Perica, 2004; Stanley, 2000; Alfeyev, 2003). In part because of EU pressure, the Greek government in 2000 brought Greece in line with other members of the European Union by removing religious affiliation from state identity cards. In protest, Archbishop Christodoulos and other Orthodox Church leaders gathered hundreds of thousands of protesters carrying Greek flags and crucifixes (Stanley, 2000). He also attacked Greeks who advocate church–state separation as "people who are servile to all things foreign and undeserving of Greek identity, and therefore incarnating national decay" (Fokas, 2000: 12). Orthodox leaders outside Greece, such as Bishop Hilarion Alfeyev, head of the Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the European Union, have also attacked the EU as imposing "militant secularism" on Europe's believers (Alfeyev, 2003).

On some of these issues, the Greek government and the mass of ordinary Orthodox have different attitudes. In general, Greeks (about 98 percent of whom are assumed to be Orthodox) have become remarkably enthusiastic about the EU and deeper integration into its norms and structures. In fact, in 2002, Greek public opinion consistently ranked well above the EU average in its support. Pagoulatos notes that the "large majority of the Greek public considers EU membership to be beneficial for Greece, trusts the European Commission, supports the Euro (80%), supports a common foreign policy and a common defense and security policy" (Pagoulatos, 2002: 23). Furthermore, despite Archbishop Christodoulos's sometimes harsh criticism of the EU, the evidence suggests that the devoutly Orthodox support the EU at even higher levels than average Greeks (Nelsen and Guth, 2003a: 102). With respect to the EU's religious identity, the Greek government has not officially supported a reference to Christianity in the EU draft constitution, and, in a major shift, began to actively support Turkey's accession to

the EU at the December 1999 European Council meeting in Helsinki (Pagoulatos, 2002: 17).

In his chapter in this volume, Vjekoslav Perica portrays a Serbian Orthodox Church whose stance is now quite close to the Greek Orthodox Church, but that was far more hostile to European integration from the 1980s up to Slobodan Milošević's electoral defeat and subsequent indictment on war crimes charges in 2000. Conservative, nationalist, Slavophile, eastward-looking, and steeped in a tradition of fallen martyrs, this was a Church that was highly hostile to Islam and that saw in the European Union a Catholic agenda dating back to its former imperialist rulers, the German Habsburgs. It found sharp confirmation of these suspicions in the EU's recognition, at Germany's behest, of Catholic Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in 1992. After Milošević's demise, the Serbian Orthodox Church took a turn toward international-ism, ecumenism, and interfaith cooperation. It began to support the EU, but guardedly, largely out of a tactical alliance with Catholicism against both secularism and Islam. Similarly, Ramet shows in her chapter that although Orthodox churches elsewhere may support European integra-tion, they do so for similar motives.

Islam and European integration

In contrast to Catholicism also stand Turkish Islamist movements, illustrated here by their most powerful organization, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Though a single movement is admittedly a narrower phenomenon than the broad array of actors constituting the other religious traditions, both the party's relative autonomy from the Turkish state and the religiosity of its participants relative to other Turkish Muslims make it a valuable indicator of Islam's role in European integration. As with Orthodoxy, simplistic generalizations must be shunned: few Muslim-majority countries have had any signifi-cant engagement with the European Union.

Until recently, the party had fiercely opposed Turkey's accession to the European Union on the grounds of a deep-seated distrust of Europe as both Christian and the original fount of the repressive secularist repub-licanism of Kemal Atatürk (Yavuz, 2000, 2003, and chapter 9, this volume; Canefe and Bora, 2003: 141–42). One observer noted as recently as 1999 that "the Islamists would like to cut Turkey's ties to the West and improve relations with the Islamic world. This is most apparent in the position taken by the Refah and Fazilet (Virtue) Parties in recent years" (Yesilada, 1999: 145). Among the many surprises of the November 2002 Turkish national elections was that the successor of these Islamist parties,

the Justice and Development Party or AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which won the elections and took control of the National Assembly, vigorously supported Turkey's accession to the EU. Furthermore, the AKP made it clear that it would work to ensure Turkey's rapid fulfillment of the political (or Copenhagen) criteria for accession. Even allowing for a recent widespread shift in favor of European integration across the spectrum of Turkey's political parties and public opinion (Carkoğlu, 2003; McClaren and Müftüler-Baç, 2003), the AKP stands out as unique in its devotion to the cause of European integration – comparing favor-ably, for example, even with the Kemalist Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP). After the AKP's victory in the November 2002 elections, one observer noted that "the AKP, *much more than any political party of the previous era*, demonstrated a high degree of commitment to the goal of full EU membership" (Önis, 2003: 30, our emphasis). Though in this volume Hakan Yavuz and Bassam Tibi differ over whether the AKP's shift represents a genuine change in out-look or is merely tactical, the occurrence and scale of the change are indisputable.

The AKP's uniquely enthusiastic support for Turkey's participation in the European Union is even more surprising when put in the context of nationwide survey data. These data suggest, among other things, that Islamist attitudes generally correlate with lower levels of support for Turkey's accession to the European Union. In a multivariate analysis of data from a May–June 2002 survey, Çarkoğlu notes that religiosity exerts a strong and highly statistically significant independent negative effect on support for Turkish membership in the EU. However, while higher religiosity weakens support for EU membership, a majority of the most religiously observant people surveyed still supports the EU. In fact, the survey data show that no major identifiable subgroup (except the virtually tautologous one of Euro-skeptics) opposes full EU membership, and that overall Turkish support stands at about 64 percent. In other words, the data suggest that the AKP's staunchly pro-EU position separates it some-what from its Islamist base – but not as dramatically as might be assumed (Çarkoğlu, 2003). Islamists in general, and the AKP leadership in parti-cular, now believe that Muslim Turkey belongs in the European Union.

Explaining the posture of religions toward European integration

In their various postures toward European integration, the religious traditions we have examined have acted in accordance with their char-acteristic ideas, institutional relationship with the state, and historical

experiences of Europe. For example, Catholicism's ecclesiology of visible transnational unity under a centralized hierarchy predisposes it to favor (or at least not be instinctively opposed to) federal and confederal political projects that transcend national boundaries (Weigel, 1999: 652). The historical experience of the Catholic Church led it to consider some form of political confederation necessary and appropriate for Europe: it believed the recent calamities of two world wars and ongoing calamity of totalitarianism made such a confederation urgently necessary, while its historical contributions to the continent's unification, civilization, and organization as a *Respublica Christiana* helped make it thinkable and realizable. The Church's long history of intense conflict with Europe's sovereign nation-states at least since Westphalia disposes it to deny that the modern nation-state is sacrosanct and to believe instead in the desirability of new political forms that revise and attenuate its "sovereign" powers. Its relatively strong hierarchical structure gives it both an interest in, and the possibility of, remaining independent from these sovereign states. All of these factors have yielded robust support for deep political integration in Europe – yet also one guided by Catholic social teaching and a pluralistic respect for other religions in the spirit of Vatican II.

Orthodox faith and practice and institutions are in some ways transnational, but Orthodox experience is inseparable from the most profound distrust of the Vatican and generally Western efforts to centralize power and authority over Christendom in Western capitals, whether Rome or Brussels. The Orthodox are also deeply committed to a view of their particular "autocephalous" national cultures; each national church is "an ark of the spirit of its people," according to Archbishop Christodoulos. The Orthodox Church enjoys closer affinity to particular nations and also, because of the legacy of Byzantine *symphonia*, particular states. The Orthodox Church is thus predictably anxious that an EU dominated by the West will be an agent either of Western Christian or militant-secularist suppression of Orthodox national cultures. The only way to prevent this, the Orthodox leaders we have examined believe, is by ensuring that the EU has more than a merely religious content but that it has some ecumenically Christian identity. Finally, for many Orthodox churchmen, only a European Union that keeps Islamic Turkey at arm's length can guarantee that the Islamic oppressions of the past remain in the past.

For Islamists in Turkey, exemplified by the Justice and Development Party, the European Union was profoundly threatening, particularly under the Welfare Party in its early days. As Yavuz describes, however, after the "soft coup" of 1997, Islamists came to hope that integration into

Europe would finally and irrevocably end the cycle of secularist repression of Islamic civil society and firmly entrench democratic norms and practices (this volume, chapter 9. At the same time, the military began to grow cool toward European integration for precisely the same reason: it feared that joining the EU would forever end its special status as the guardian of secularist republicanism. It was the weakness and non-autonomous character of Turkish Islam that prevented it from having the dramatic democratizing political effects other religious bodies delivered in the revolutions of 1989, and this weakness has caused it to reach outside Turkey in the hope that joining Christian Europe might enable Atatürk's republic to become fully democratic once and for all. According to Yavuz, "Given the long and deeply ingrained tradition of 'statism' in Turkey, it would have been very difficult to achieve the desired democratic transformation of the Turkish state and society relying on domestic factors alone" (this volume, chapter 9). Here, the relationship between differentiation and European integration, and for that matter, democratization, is strong, though it does not function quite as it does in the Catholic case. In Turkey, European integration is a strategy not of a religious community that is already differentiated and autonomous but of one that *seeks* to become differentiated and autonomous. Joining the European Union, for the AKP, is a way of cementing its freedom to participate openly in the Turkish state, and hence, a route to making the Turkish state more democratic. It thus contributes simultaneously to European transnational unity in both dimensions: integration and democratization.

Conclusion: religions and the uniting of Europe

What all of these cases powerfully illustrate is the immense transnational influence of religion on European politics, particularly the unification of the continent. Here, transnationalism means differentiation: the more a religious community entails an organization that extends across borders and enjoys independence from the state, the more likely it is to favor European political unity. In the case of both Catholicism and Turkish Islamism, religion is a force that deepens and extends common European values and institutions. The Catholic Church favors the eastward extension of the European Union and at least officially does not oppose the accession of Turkey. The Turkish Justice and Development Party favors uniting Turkey to the European Union, thus committing it to common norms of human rights and democracy. The Orthodox churches have a more divisive influence. To the degree that they favor European integration, they tend to do so as an alliance with Western Christianity against

secularism and Islam. Among religions, then, the politics of unification is both unifying and divisive.

As for their future within the European Union, however, all of these European religions are more likely to be engaged in clashes with European secularism than with each other. The Catholic Church has already begun to object to secularizing trends in European Union law. Even if Turkey were to join the European Union under Islamist leadership, Islamist groups may well advocate laws that violate European norms – just as they attempted to outlaw adultery in autumn 2004. The Orthodox Church is likely to continue its vociferous condemnation of secularism in the European Union.

All of these trends pertain to what Charles Tilly has called "big structures, large processes, huge comparisons" (Tilly, 1984). "Long time horizons" might be added. Certainly, each religious tradition contains, and has contained over the course of centuries, competing voices on virtually every question regarding the political order. It is important to remember, too, that there are other sources of their positions on democracy and European integration besides political theology and institutional differentiation – their economic views, for instance. Still, the positions of these large religious communities are distinct and coherent enough to be compared. Ideas and institutions that have evolved over centuries strongly shape the stances of Europe's religious communities toward European unity.

The claim gains even more strength from comparison with another European religious community or more accurately set of communities – the Protestant churches. Though diverse in their theologies and institutions, ranging from the "magisterial Reformation" of Lutheranism and Anglicanism to the "low church" reformation of Baptists, Anabaptists, and Mennonites, Protestant churches are united historically in their "protest" against the Catholic Church of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in their rejection of its aspirations to European unity. Ecclesiologically, Protestant churches either lack a notion of visible unity or hold a much weaker notion of it than either the Catholic or Orthodox Church, leaving them with a more circumscribed structure to sustain. At least the magisterial Reformation is a close historical ally of the sovereign state, whose armies could provide Protestants protection and whose powers usurped the remaining temporal powers of the Catholic Church, a desideratum of Protestant theology. The largest strands of the Reformation also embraced national and linguistic particularity, even forming national churches in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, England, and Scotland, as Nexon elaborates in this volume. Although in more radical forms of early modern Protestantism we find the origins of modern religious freedom as well as important roots of modern democracy,

we also find in the magisterial Reformation a strong notion of church deference to state power, with relatively little institutional autonomy or exercise of accountability.

Contemporary Protestant stances toward European unity follow from these factors. In the democratic revolutions of 1989, the main Protestant country to leave communism behind was the German Democratic Republic (GDR), where the hierarchy of the Evangelische Church offered only weak opposition to the communist state, at least until the revolutions of 1989 were underway. The Evangelische Church was indeed a descendant of a historical state Church, long allied closely with state authority. Stronger opposition to the communist state came from the lower ranks of this Church, who were less tied to the institutional form and less theologically inclined. Similar patterns obtained in Protestant Latvia and Estonia (Monshipouri, 1996; Conway, 1994; Kellogg, 2001).

Protestant stances toward European integration are complex, including supporters and opponents. Generally, though, European Protestants are less enthusiastic about European integration than their Catholic contemporaries. Even leaders and groups that have supported integration have also expressed ambivalence and restrained enthusiasm. This includes George Carey, the former Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, and the present Archbishop of the Finnish Lutheran Church, Jukka Paarma, as well as the most important network of Protestant churches, the Conference of European Churches (CEC) (Carey, 1999: 2; Paarma, 2002). Contrasting with this ambivalence is the unequivocal hostility of non-established evangelical churches as well as self-avowed "fundamentalists" such as Northern Ireland's Ian Paisley. Finally, surveys of public opinion data show Protestant masses to be systematically less enthusiastic about European political integration than their Catholic contemporaries (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser, 2001; Nelsen and Guth, 2003a).

What the Protestant churches illustrate is that those religious communities most historically bound up in the creation of the sovereign state and most historically opposed to a united Christendom remained decidedly lukewarm toward European unity even in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This is precisely what a historical institutionalist explanation would expect. In contrast, those religious communities that most strongly envision and embody a European entity larger than the state have been most vigorously supported the democratic revolutions of 1989 and the expansion of the European Union.

Notes

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1 Protestantism is certainly also one of Europe's "predominant" religions, but space considerations prevent a full treatment of its relationship to European democratization and integration, but see our conclusion.
2 Again, complexity must be noted, for the Catholic Church's record against fascism is far from uniform. It signed a concordat with fascist regimes in both Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy during the 1920s and 1930s. A fascist Catholic priest ruled Slovakia in World War Two, the Catholic fascist *Ustasha* in Croatia allied with Hitler, and groups of fascist Catholics existed elsewhere in Europe.

3   Religion, European secular identities, and European integration

José Casanova

Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that established the EEC and initiated the ongoing process of European integration, Western European societies have undergone a rapid, drastic, and seemingly irreversible process of secularization. In this respect, one can talk of the emergence of a post-Christian Europe. At the same time, the process of European integration, the eastward expansion of the European Union, and the drafting of a European constitution have triggered fundamental questions concerning European identity and the role of Christianity in that identity. What constitutes "Europe"? How and where should one draw the external territorial and the internal cultural boundaries of Europe? The most controversial, yet rarely openly confronted and therefore most anxiety-producing, issues are the potential integration of Turkey and the potential integration of non-European immigrants, who in most European countries happen to be overwhelmingly Muslim. But the eastward expansion of the European Union, particularly the incorporation of an assertive Catholic Poland, and the debates over some kind of affirmation or recognition of the Christian heritage in the preamble of the new European constitution, have added unexpected "religious" irritants to the debates over Europeanization. It is the interrelation between these phenomena – the role of Catholic Poland, the incorporation of Turkey, the integration of Muslim immigrants, and references to the Christian heritage in the European constitution – and the European secular mindset that I would like to explore in this chapter.[1]

The progressive, though highly uneven, secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact (Martin, 1978; Greeley, 2003). An increasing majority of the European population has ceased participating in traditional religious practices, at least on a regular basis, while still maintaining relatively high levels of private individual religious beliefs. In this respect, one should perhaps talk of the *unchurching* of the European population and of religious individualization, rather than of secularization. Grace Davie (1994b, 2000) has characterized this general European situation as "believing without belonging." At the same time, however, large numbers