Abstract and Keywords

This chapter on religion and international security begins by arguing that religion was largely absent from International Relations (IR) theory since its modern founding in early modern Europe, mirroring its lack of influence on actual IR during the same period. Over the past four decades, though, religion has resurfaced in its global political influence, while, over the past decade-and-a-half, a literature on religion and IR has appeared and developed. The chapter then looks at this literature, particularly at scholarship that argues for and against religion’s inherently violent nature; that sees religion as a force for both peace and violence; that describes and tracks trends in religious war and religious terrorism; that argues for and against Islam’s proneness to violence; and that seeks to theorize the varying political stances of religious actors. The chapter closes with an analysis of a normative debate on religious freedom.

Keywords: religion and international security, religion and war, religion and terrorism, religion and civil war, religious civil wars, religious freedom, secular, secularization, secularism

Some time prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, CIA analyst Earnest Oney broached to his bosses a study of religious leaders in Iran. Scholar of Iran, James A. Bill, describes the response:

His bureaucratic superiors vetoed the idea, dismissing it as “sociology.” The work climate was such that he was sometimes condescendingly referred to by others in the government as “Mullah Ernie.” It was not until the revolution and after his retirement that he was able to do his study on the force of religion in Iran. He did it for the agency on contract—after the force of religion had been felt not only in Iran but by America as well (Bill 1988: 417).
The Iranian Revolution, wrought by Shia Islam, created a crisis in US foreign policy, brought down a US president, realigned Middle Eastern politics, and led to a war between Iran and its neighbor, Iraq—a majority Shia state then controlled by a secularist Sunni regime—that lasted eight years and took an estimated one million lives.

During the 1990s, religiously-inspired terrorism expanded rapidly and displayed itself most spectacularly in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Combatting this terrorism then preoccupied the foreign policies of the United States, European states, and other countries like India, Indonesia, Russia, and Nigeria and shaped their alignments and relations with countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Civil war in Iraq and Afghanistan became the besetting dilemmas of the United States and its allies in the past decade-and-a-half and have been propelled by religion, as have conflicts in Iraq and Syria, where the Islamic State and other Islamist militant groups battle government authorities.

Since the Iranian Revolution, religion has also contributed critically to conflicts in Tajikistan, Kashmir, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Chechnya, Sudan, India, Burma, Israel–Palestine, and other locales. Earnest Oney was right and sociology—as well as political science, religious studies, and related fields—has been struggling to catch up ever since. Until about 2000, religion had little place in the international relations sub-field of political science. In the period 1980–99, only six or so articles in four leading International Relations journals—*International Organization*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *World Politics*, and *International Security*—featured religion as an important influence in International Relations (Philpott 2001: 9). Since that time, corresponding to global events, a body of scholarship on religion and international relations has arisen in which war, violence, and security are central topics. This strand of study remains small in proportion to newspaper headlines.

Why did not International Relations (IR) scholars study religion prior to this period? How does the absence and then the appearance of scholarship on religion in international politics correspond to historical reality? What themes, theses, and prescriptions for policy have emerged?

### 19.1 The Rise and Fall of Secularism in International Relations

Why has religion arisen recently in IR thought? The better question may be: Why was it absent in the first place? Religion scholar Martin Riesebrodt has written in his recent book, *The Promise of Salvation* (2011: xiii, 19), that “[r]eligion’s promise ... remains astonishingly constant in different historical periods and cultures.” He elaborates, “[a]ll humans belong to the same species” and manifest “universal characteristics ... and thus
Religion and International Security

are not arbitrarily or infinitely variable or unbridgeably different.” Arguably, then, what needs to be explained is the rise of a historically anomalous outlook that denies the reality and relevance of religion.

That outlook is the secularization thesis, one of the central themes in modern Western thought and politics. Secular—or secularism or secularization—has many meanings (Philpott 2009: 185). The one that confronts religion most sharply—history’s most influential antithesis to religion—holds that religion is an irrational atavism receding in its influence on human affairs and destined to disappear in the face of modernity’s inexorable forces: science, economic progress, free inquiry, technological advancement, political liberalization, and democratization. Originating in the Enlightenment, the theory seemed to have triumphed in the late 1960s when the cover of Time magazine read “Is God Dead?” and when Peter Berger, one of the great sociologists of the past generation, told the New York Times that by “the 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture” (Berger 1968).

IR theory has been secular from its origins. The founders of both the realist and liberal traditions (see Doyle 1997) built their theories around their view that religion’s influence on politics was in decline. Niccolo Machiavelli, Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant all viewed the state as a distinct body politic—a Leviathan, Hobbes called it—that was constituted apart from religion and was free from ecclesiastical authority from without and superior to such authority within. They viewed the purpose of the state not in the way that medieval thinkers like Thomas Aquinas had viewed it—inculcating virtue or preserving the Church—but rather in terms of what Cardinal Richelieu called Raison d’Etat. For realists, this included security and power, defined in terms of military capacity, wealth, land, population, and other hard resources. Liberals, too, counseled these ends, but thought them achievable through international norms and institutions, free commerce, and liberal democratic governance. Early International Relations theorists did not merely depict a world of politics without religion but also prescribed and celebrated it. Machiavelli saw religion as enfeebling while the later thinkers saw it as the cause of wars across Europe and thus something to be tamed. They placed morality on a foundation of reason, not revelation. Rousseau went so far as to recommend the invention of a civic religion that would buttress the state and to advocate the death penalty for violating its precepts (Rousseau 1994: 223).

All of these secular commitments persist in modern IR theory, both liberal and realist. Hans Morgenthau, perhaps the leading realist of the twentieth century, held that politics is not and could not be pursued in religious terms. In 1962, he wrote that:

The moral problem of politics is posed by the inescapable discrepancy between the commands of Christian teaching, of Christian ethics, and the requirements of political success. It is impossible, if I may put it in somewhat extreme and striking terms, to be a successful politician and a good Christian. (Morgenthau 1962: 102)
Religion and International Security

Steeped in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenthau posited power as the central category in international politics and prescribed that statecraft be pursued through a form of consequentialism, “the morality of the national interest.” Religious actors and ideas were either irrelevant or inimical to this pursuit.

The secularism of IR thought corresponded to the onset and expansion of secularism in global politics. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is iconic. Although scholars disagree about whether Westphalia was the origin of the modern international system (see Krasner 1993; Philpott 2001; Osiander 2001; Nexon 2009; de Carvalho et al. 2011), the surrounding century was one in which the states system was consolidated as secular. By Westphalia, the sovereign state had become the predominant form of political authority in Europe while the transnational temporal authority of the Catholic Church was sharply curtailed. Following Westphalia, religiously motivated interventions saw a sharp diminuendo. Within states, both Catholic and Protestant, there arose Erastianism, the subordinating of churches to state authority. The rise of nationalism directed popular loyalties away from religion and toward “faith in the nation,” as the title of Anthony Marx’s book put it (Marx, 2003). Secularism deepened with the French Revolution, which, following Rousseau’s script, created for the first time a regime that rejected Christianity and sought to strip the Church even of its own ecclesial authority. Parties and regimes inspired by the revolution carried this secularism into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and triumphed in France, Italy, several Latin American countries, Mexico in the 1920s, and certain European colonies, among other places. In the twentieth century, Communist regimes and Nazi Germany advanced hostility to religion to levels as yet unseen. After the Second World War, a transnational network of secular leaders in postcolonial regimes in the Arab world as well as Kenya, Indonesia, Iran, and Sri Lanka, sought to place their countries’ politics on a secular footing (Shah and Philpott 2011: 37–46).

It was right around the time that Berger and Time magazine proclaimed the death of religion that, in retrospect, secularism had reached its peak and the resurgence of religion’s influence in global politics began. Beginning in the late 1960s, a sharp growth in political activity took place in every major religion in every area of the world. A global Islamic resurgence, the rise of Jewish nationalism after the Six Day War, the political engagement of the Catholic Church following the Second Vatican Council, the rise of Hindu and Buddhist nationalism, the rise of the Religious Right in the United States, the growth of Christianity in China, religious terrorism, religious civil war, and religion’s important role in the “third wave” of democratization all exemplified the trend. Through these events, religious engagement in politics rose, or, to turn the matter on its head again, secularism fell.

In 1998, Peter Berger humbly retracted his prediction of 30 years earlier, declaring that “the world today ... is as furiously religious as it ever was” (Berger 1999: 2). By then, a small body of scholarship on religion in global politics—little of it by political scientists—had appeared, covering topics like fundamentalism, religious nationalism, desecularization, and Islam (Rapaport 1984; Marty and Appleby 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995;
Religion and International Security

Little 1991; Juergensmeyer 1993; Casanova 1994; Esposito 1999). What brought religion into political science—explosively at that—was Samuel Huntington’s Foreign Affairs article (1993) and then trade press book (1996) holding that a “clash of civilizations” based on religious identities would define major conflicts in global politics in the coming historical era. Huntington’s thesis was debated furiously around the world in embassies, universities, and the media. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of his argument, Huntington had perceived religion’s resurgence in global politics at a time when few other political scientists had. Over the next decade, a group of other political science IR scholars challenged the secularization thesis and sought to adumbrate frameworks for studying religion (Fox 2001; Philpott 2001; Fox 2002; Petitio and Hatzopoulos 2003; Fox and Sandler 2004; Thomas 2004; Philpott 2007; Hurd 2008). During that same decade, the attacks of September 11 took place, seemingly vindicating Huntington and establishing beyond doubt the relevance of religion to IR and to international security in particular.

19.2 Recent Scholarship on Religion and Security

What are some of the themes in this emergent area of inquiry? Most of the scholarship grapples in one way or another with religion’s relationship to armed conflict: war, especially civil war, and terrorist violence. A few scholars pose the question in the widest way, asking whether religion is inherently violent. Proponents of a strong form of the secularization theory persist, holding that religion is violent by nature. A group of writers who attained popularity as the “new atheists” hold this view (Harris 2005; Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006; Hitchens 2007). Theologian William Cavanaugh (2009) identifies a group of other scholars who hold the view and summarizes their explanation for religion’s violence: religion is irrational, inherently divisive, and absolute.

Cavanaugh takes issue, though, arguing against what he calls the “myth of religious violence.” The myth, he explains, is the idea that “religion is a transhistorical and transcultural feature of human life, essentially distinct from ‘secular’ features such as politics and economics, which has a peculiarly dangerous inclination to promote violence” (Cavanaugh 2009: 3). The lesson of the myth is that religion must be marginalized in order to keep safe the secular nation state, which is natural and stable.

Demurring, Cavanaugh challenges the notion that religion is a general phenomenon of which there are separate types as well as the distinction between religious and secular violence, which he finds incoherent. What is considered religion and what is considered secular differs from setting to setting and results from different configurations of power.

The configuration behind the myth of religious violence is the rise of the Western state, which supplanted religious authority in early modern Europe and propounded the myth of religious violence to legitimate its authority. The secular state and its attendant
ideologies, though, have proven just as absolute, divisive, and irrational as religion has been alleged to be. Cavanaugh conducts a close historical analysis of the “religious wars” of early modern Europe, by which secular liberals—and, recall, the early theorists of International Relations—justified the state and concludes that they were as much about political power, economics, and related causes as they were about religion (Cavanaugh 2009: 3–14).

Strong echoes of Cavanaugh can be found in the arguments of political analysts Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson, who question the concept of “religious terrorism,” that has been so prominent in Western analysis since September 11. To Gunning and Jackson, the distinction between religion and secular terrorism is indefensible conceptually and empirically and serves to delegitimize “religious” actors while legitimizing questionable counter-terrorist policies (Gunning and Jackson 2011).

A broader range of scholars does not argue that religion is (or is not) inherently violent but rather views religion as a force with potential for both violence and peace and offers explanations for why it takes either form. Historian R. Scott Appleby (2000), for instance, argues for the “ambivalence of the sacred” and explores both religious violence and religious peacebuilding. Political scientist Jonathan Fox, one of the pioneering voices in the current wave of scholarship, identified in the Minorities at Risk dataset a subset of ethnic conflicts where the warring groups are of different religions and called them “ethnoreligious conflicts.” In 2002, he identified 105 out of 268 disputes in the world, or 39 percent, as ethnoreligious (Fox 2002: 70–1). Political scientist Monica Duffy Toft (2007: 103), in her work on religious civil wars, shows that from 1940 to 2000, 42 out of 133 civil wars, or 32 percent, have involved religion. She divides these conflicts into two kinds: those in which religion shapes the identity of warring factions and those in which religion shapes the identity as well as the ends of these factions. Several scholars, contra Gunning and Jackson, have argued that religion fashions a unique form of terrorism, one that is performative and expressive rather than merely strategic, and is conducted as a divine duty, a cosmic war, or an apocalyptic struggle (Rapaport 1984; Ranstorp 1996; Hoffman 1998: 94–9; Juergensmeyer 2003; Stern 2003: 6–8; Moghadam 2008a, 2008b). For these scholars, religion is one form of violence and violence is one form of religion.

Some scholars in this category have offered innovative accounts of how religion shapes violence. One of the most creative of these is political scientist Ron Hassner, who, in his book, War on Sacred Grounds (2009), shows how religion, understood not just as theology but also as ritual, symbol, and community, renders sacred sites objects of armed conflict. In a successor book, Religion on the Battlefield (2016), Hassner depicts how religion shapes, enables, and constrains the very conduct of war. Into this category also falls religious studies scholar Michael Sells (1996), who shows how Yugoslavia’s wars of the 1990s were sparked by “folk religion” that is theologically impoverished but rich in ritual, lore, and ethnicity and thus ripe for exploitation by bellicose demagogues. Of this type, too, is the work of Shane Barter and Ian Zatkin-Osburn, who study religious conflict in
Southeast Asia through the religious credentials of rebel leaders, recruitment networks, public discourse, and, most innovatively, burial practices (Barter and Zatkin-Osburn 2014).

A common theme among this set of scholars is that religious violence has increased in recent decades. Bruce Hoffmann, arguably the leading scholar of religious terrorism, shows that while in 1968, all of the world’s 11 terrorist groups were secular, religious terrorist groups appeared in the early 1980s and grew to 46 percent of the world’s 56 terrorist groups by the mid-1990s (Hoffman 1998: 90–4). Political scientist Assaf Moghadam (2008a, 2008b) focuses on suicide terrorists and shows their religious motivation and their sharp expansion since their debut in 1981. Toft reports that religious civil wars have increased sharply in proportion to all civil wars from 19 percent of civil wars in the 1940s to 50 percent of civil wars in the 2000s (Toft 2006: 9). Peace scholar Isak Svensson likewise shows that religious civil wars have become increasingly common in the Middle East and North Africa (Svensson 2013).

Another common, yet also debated, thesis is that religious forms of violence are more severe than other forms. Toft, for instance, finds that religious civil wars result in more casualties and non-combatant deaths and last longer than non-religious civil wars (Toft 2007). Both Fox and political scientist Philip Roeder adduce quantitative evidence that religious conflicts are more intense (last longer, have more deaths) than non-religious conflicts (Roeder 2003; Fox 2004). Susanna Pearce’s (2005), nuanced study of 278 territorial conflict phases shows that religious conflicts are more intense than other ones but also that the relationship disappears when religious goals are taken into account and that no religion manifests a higher or lower intensity than others. In like spirit, Svensson finds that religious wars are more difficult to resolve than civil wars, explains that the reason lies not in religious identities but rather in explicitly religious demands, and argues that religion nonetheless carries resources for conflict resolution (Svensson 2012, 2013). Political scientists Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger argue that religion carries a propensity to escalate conflicts by rendering them conflicts of values rather than interests, increasing the willingness of parties to make sacrifices, decreasing trust, and lowering the possibility of conflict resolution (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000). Focusing on suicide terrorism, political scientist Peter Henne finds that religious ideology sharply increases the death toll of attacks even when terrorist groups’ goals and organizational nature are controlled for (Henne 2012). Quite a different view than these, though, is that of political scientist Matthew Isaacs (2016), who confronted the question of why religious conflicts are comparatively more violent by studying the religious rhetoric of 495 political organizations from 1970 to 2012 and found that, in fact, previous engagement in violence makes religious rhetoric more likely and not the reverse. For Isaacs, religion is more an instrument than an initiator.

A version of this debate—one that is more hotly contested in the public sphere—is whether Islam in particular is prone to violence. Toft (2006: 15, 2007: 113–14), for instance, reports that one or both parties were Muslim in 34 of 42, or 81 percent, of religious civil wars; that 58 percent of all states that have fought civil wars have majority
Muslim populations; and that 9 out of 10 religious civil wars fought between groups of the same faith have involved Muslims. Fox (2004: 68) also reports that conflict rose among Muslims during the 1990s. Toft (2007) attributes the disproportionate presence of Islam to the absence of internal war on the scale of the early modern religious wars, which brought tolerance to Christianity; the nearness of Islam’s holiest sites to both Israel and to vast oil reserves; and the presence of jihadist ideology. In a separate piece, Toft and Yuri Zhukov (2015) showed that in the North Caucasus, Salafi-Jihadi militant groups were more difficult to defeat than nationalist rebel groups in good part because the ideology of the Islamists linked them to transnational sources of support. My own research (Philpott 2007: 520) found in that in 2007, 91 percent of all religious terrorist groups were radical Islamist ones.

Other scholars, though, argue that Islam itself is not the source of greater violence. In a study of casualties resulting from terrorist attacks, political scientist James Piazza (2009) discovers that death rates are more attributable to groups’ organizational structures and goals than to their ideology or religion. Namely, groups with universal and abstract goals inflict more casualties than ones with concrete, strategic goals. On the same side of the debate, Indra de Soysa and Ragnhild Nordås (2007) show that Muslim societies actually experience lower levels of terrorism than others, that location in the Arab region explains what appears to be due to Islam, and that Catholic societies experience the worst levels of terrorism among populations defined by religiosity.

Finally, among the scholarship that views religion as diverse in its behaviors is an effort to explain the “political ambivalence” of religion by identifying two influences on the behavior of religious actors (Philpott 2007; Toft et al. 2011). First is the institutional independence of political and religious authority, which is roughly a combination of religious freedom and separation of religion and state (see Fox 2008). The second is political theology, or the doctrines about political authority and justice that religious actors derive from their more foundational theology. Religious actors who enjoy institutional independence and who hold a political theology that favors liberalism, democracy, reconciliation, or a restrictive doctrine of war are more likely to take action in favor of democracy, peacemaking, or reconciliation. By contrast, religious actors who practice little institutional independence from their state—either through being marginalized from or acting in close collaboration with the state—and who espouse a political theology that favors violence or religious authoritarianism are more prone to undertake violence or to support dictatorship.

Supportive of this theory is the work of social scientists who demonstrate a relationship between the denial of religious freedom and religious violence (Grim and Finke, 2011; Saiya 2015, 2015). Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke (2011: 70–87), for instance, show that “government restriction of religion” as well as the restriction of religion on the part of non-state actors beget violent persecution. Nilay Saiya shows how states which hinder religious freedom contribute to four kinds of violence—domestic religious terrorism, international religious terrorism, religious civil wars, and interstate conflicts—while
states that favor religious freedom are far less prone to such violence. Thus, Saiya argues, we can speak of a “religious freedom peace” (2015: title).

19.3 Religious Freedom: A Normative Lesson?

The religious freedom peace: might this be a normative lesson, a policy prescription to emerge from the recent wave of scholarship on religion and security? It is surely not the only such lesson but it is one that is linked closely with the analyses in this scholarship (for a thoughtful piece on the ethics of religion and violence, see Lynch 2014). A human right that protects the religious belief and practice of persons and communities, religious freedom entails an enduring, principled commitment to respect and share citizenship with people of different religions and of different views toward the same religion. Were religious freedom ensconced in law, institutions, culture, and the teachings of religious traditions themselves, might it serve as an antidote to religious violence and intolerance?

Religious freedom is ensconced in international norms and law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other conventions. In 1998, the United States Congress overwhelmingly passed the International Religious Freedom Act, which created a standing foreign policy apparatus, including an ambassador-at-large, to promote religious freedom around the world. In more recent years, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Canada have adopted religious freedom into their foreign policies in one way or another (though Canada has just reversed course). All of these laws and policies are vehicles through which religious freedom has been and might be further widened. But they are not without controversy.

A recent wave of critics of religious freedom have arisen from the academy, prominent among them political scientist Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, whose 2008 book, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, stands as one of the central contributions to the current revival of religion in IR scholarship. There, she criticized the field for its secularism and marginalization of religion. In her more recent work (2015), she criticizes religious freedom proponents for committing the opposite error: privileging religion analytically and promoting religious freedom politically to the exclusion of all else. Hurd has also co-edited a volume containing 27 statements from a variety of scholars in this same school (Sullivan et al. 2015). Let us call these scholars the “new critics of religious freedom” (see also Mahmood 2016).

Though the arguments of the new critics are wide-ranging, their views can be summarized in four propositions. First, religious freedom differs so strongly in its meanings across time and place that there simply is no single thing to which everyone has a right. A strong implication is that Westerners ought not to render universal what is in fact their own parochial principle. Second, what accounts for how religious freedom is defined in this or that place is rather the power and the interests of those doing the
defining. Running through the new critics’ writings is the imprint of philosopher Michel Foucault and his view that principles and knowledge are forms of power. Several of the new critics hold that religious freedom is a tool of American as well as Christian power. Third, modern religious freedom is a product of particular developments in Western history, especially the Protestant Reformation and the secularization that followed in its wake. This view, many of the critics derive from anthropologist Talal Asad (see 1993, 2003). Like Asad and echoing Cavanaugh, they believe that the concept of religion and the principle of religious freedom are products of modernity. Fourth is a prescription: Westerners ought not to export religious freedom.

These propositions, though, admit of criticism. With respect to the first proposition, numerous thinkers, both past and contemporary, have defended the universality of religion as a human phenomenon and the validity of religious freedom as a basic human right. Though the new critics point to diverse expressions of religion and views of religious freedom, it does not follow from this diversity that defensible versions of these principles do not exist.

The second proposition, that religious freedom is a product and tool of power, is difficult to square with the reality of global power. The United States, than whom no state is more powerful or more committed to religious freedom, thus far has marginalized religious freedom in its foreign policy, regularly subordinating it to security and economic interests. To the degree that the US and other Western powers do promote religious freedom, they do so on behalf of powerless religious minorities, on whose behalf there is little incentive for anyone to advocate.

The third claim, that religious freedom is a product of modern Western history, is subject to scrutiny as well. Religious freedom long pre-dates the Protestant Reformation and Enlightenment and was espoused by early Christian thinkers like Lactantius and Tertullian (Shah 2015). Its history is fraught, too, in the modern West, where the French Revolution and its successor movements sharply curtailed the freedom of the Catholic Church and the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany violated religious freedom more than any other regime in all of history. Religious freedom can be found in non-Christian religions as well, as in the Quran’s injunction, “Let there be no compulsion in religion.”

From this analysis follows a conclusion that takes issue with the fourth proposition: there is no reason why states should refrain from promoting religious freedom beyond their borders. Arguably there are advantages to promoting it multilaterally and integrating with other foreign policy and security goals. If the analysis of Saiya (2015), Toft et al. (2011), and others (Farr 2008) is correct, there is a complementarity to be realized between religious freedom and the reduction of terrorism and armed conflict, the settlement of civil wars, and the promotion of democracy.
19.4 Into the Future?

Is the study of religion and international security here to stay? Yes, as long as religion’s engagement with politics is here to stay. There are reasons to believe that this is the case. Recall that I turned the puzzle of religious resurgence on its head. People have always been religious and are still so. A 2012 study by the Pew Research Center showed that in 2010, 84 percent of the world’s population was affiliated with a religion. What needs to be accounted for is why an ideology that forcibly supplanted religion’s role in politics encountered decline.

Ironically, the forces that have laid low secularist regimes are some of the very ones that secularization theorists predicted would bring down religion: political openness, the free exchange of ideas, and the advance of technology. The regimes that have suppressed religion have typically been brutal dictatorships—necessarily so, for they have ruled over populations that are usually far more religious. The Republic of Turkey, for instance, was founded in 1923 as a strongly secularist regime based on nationalism and modernization, and for decades repeatedly overturned elections that returned majorities for Muslim parties. Finally, in 2002, Turkey took a stride toward democracy by allowing the Justice and Development Party, an Islamic party, to govern after it won a national election. More generally, the secular ideologies of the “Bandung Generation” of the 1950s and 1960s and of Communist regimes around the world in the twentieth century have been drained of prestige by economic stagnation, corruption, and popular weariness with the denial of freedom. A global wave of democratization beginning around 1974 has created space for religious movements to ply their political wares.

Religiously-based politics has also thrived on modern travel, communication technology, and the global increase in flows of people and ideas across borders. Pope John Paul II’s global travels, for instance, often placed him in a position to challenge dictatorships. Al Qaeda has made strong use of cell phones and computers. Jewish and Hindu diaspora populations in the United States use media and the Internet to support religious nationalism in Israel and India. Empowered by globalization and modernization, politically engaged religious actors have become transnational ones.

(p. 284) Globalization, modernization, and democratization are here to stay, whatever their temporary reversals. Under these conditions, religious people will not remain confined to private devotion and worship but will strive to influence their societies and their governments, for good and for ill, and will insist on the freedom to do so. There will remain plenty of work, then, for scholars of religion and global politics.

References


Religion and International Security


Religion and International Security


Religion and International Security


Daniel Philpott

Daniel Philpott is Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame.